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domestic money demand  is influenced by foreign economic variables.
Another  term that  has been subject  to different interpretations  is dollarization. Through-
out the 1980s, it was common to treat  the terms  "currency substitution"  and  "dollarization"
as indistinguishable.  Both  terms described  a situation  where local residents demand  dollars.
This  misunderstanding  follows perhaps  from  the  fact  that  most  of the  studies  of currency
substitution  in the  1980s were focused on Latin  America,  and it is well documented  that  the
substitution  of currencies in Latin American countries  favored the U.S. dollar.  Currently,  the
term  dollarization  is also used  to describe  the replacement,  by monetary  authorities,  of the
national currency by the dollar  as legal tender.'
While  there  exists  a  good  theoretical  understanding  of the  implications  of having  two
monies, the empirical  consequences are still an open  issue.  It  is commonly believed tlhat al-
lowing a foreign currency to coexist with the domestic one provides the opportunity  for greater
domestic intermediation,  promotes financial sophistication by increasing the number of avail-
able assets, and increases credibility by raising the cost of monetary indiscipline.  Furthermore,
the rapid development of foreign currency-denominated  operations  in the banking system af-
fects the  stability  of monetary  aggregates,  the dynamics  of exchange rates,  and  government
revenues from seigniorage. 2 Specifically, the higher the demand  elasticity  of substitution  be-
tween monies, the larger  the  shift  from foreign to  domestic  currency  as a result  of the fall
in expected  inflation,  and  thus  the  higher the  fall in  the nominal  exchange rate.  Currency
substitution  also reduces  monetary  independence,  which may  then  endanger  the  ability  of
central  bankers  to implement  stabilization  programs.  Finally, currency  substitution  lessens
the central bank's  ability to act effectively as a lender of last resort.
The purpose of this paper is to determine  empirically the causes and significance of curren-
cy substitution  in Latin America, as well as to explore some of its macroeconomic consequences
in the last decade.  Using panel data  for thirteen  Latin American countries from 1990 to 1998,
we estimate  a static  (one-period)  portfolio  balance model,  where optimal  bank  deposits  de-
nominated  in both  local currency  and  dollars are chosen simultaneously.  Our results  reveal
that  the dollar deposits  to broad  money ratio  is strongly  influenced by depreciation  expecta-
'In  the current debate of adopting the dollar as legal tender, a new distinction has developed: unilateral
full dollarization, meaning a country adopts the U.S. dollar on its own, versus the unlikely but theoretically
feasible  multilateral agreement of an economic  block with the U.S. dollar as the common  currency.
2A good discussion  of seigniorage  losses due to the adoption of a foreign currency is provided in Fischer
(1982).
3tions of the domestic currency and the level of income. Using longer time series for a subset of
three  countries, we find that  the probability  of a banking crisis contemporaneously  decreases
with  the degree of currency  substitution.  Once in a banking  crisis, however, the  higher the
degree of currency substitution,  the higher the probability  of a future  crisis.  Finally, we find
that  volatility in macroeconomic aggregates  linked to the financial system increases with the
degree of currency substitution.
2  Currency  Substitution  in  Latin  America
During  the  last  three  decades,  currency  substitution  -partial  dollarization-  has  been  an
important  phenomenon in several Latin  American  countries.  The process began in the early
1970s fueled by financial reforms.  As capital  and foreign exchange controls were lifted, the US
dollar began to gradually replace local currencies in the domestic citizens' portfolio.  In several
countries the observed pattern  has been as follows; the dollar has first been used as a store of
value as residents maintained  increasing portions  of their wealth in dollar-denominated  assets
in order to  avoid possible losses brought  by macroeconomic instabilities.  The dollar has then
been used as a unit of account, mainly in the real estate  sector, where prices have increasingly
been quoted in dollars as a way to differentiate between changes in relative prices and changes
in overall inflation.  And finally the dollar has been used as medium  of exchange.
Today many transactions  in several Latin  American countries  are actually  carried  out  in
dollars.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of the partial  dollarization phenomena  in Latin America
during  the last decade.  Currency  substitution,  however, has not  been widespread across the
region.  While  in some countries  like Brazil,  Chile and  Venezuela currency substitution  has
not  been a significant phenomenon,  in others,  such  as Bolivia,  Uruguay  and  more recently
Ecuador,  dollar deposits  have been a very important  component  of monetary  aggregates  (see
Figure  2, 3, 4 and  5).  Moreover,  we find  Panama,  and  more recently  Ecuador,  where the
dollar has been adopted  as legal tender.
The  corresponding empirical  literature  on currency substitution  has primarily  focused on
the study  of its main determinants.  In general, several measures of macroeconomic instability
have been used  as explanatory  variables  -proxies  for the  expected  depreciation  being  the
most commonly used-  in reduced money demand equations that  allow for holdings of foreign
currency.  Throughout  the  literature  we find  several case studies:  Ortiz  (1983) on Mexico,
Ramirez-Rojas  (1985) on  Argentina,  Mexico and  Uruguay,  Marquez  (1987) on  Venezuela,
Rojas-Suarez  (1991) on Peru, and Clements  et al. (1992) on Bolivia. Some of these papers have
4found significant and positive,  although  not  always statistically  different from zero, signs on
the coefficients for expected depreciation  of the domestic currency  and inflation in regressions
where the  ratio  of foreign currency  deposits  in  the  financial system  is used as  a  proxy for
the degree of dollarization.  These  results  suggest  then  that  depositors  run  away from local
currencies  whenever they expect  losses associated  with their  domestic currency.
However, there have been some cases where we find an increase  in the degree of dollariza-
tion while the country is following a successful macroeconomic stabilization  program.  Bolivia,
for example, experienced  an  increase  in  dollarization  after the  macroeconomic  stabilization
program of 1985. In fact, Clements  et al. (1992) find that  interest  rate differentials and other
measures for expected depreciation  performed  poorly when used as explanatory  variables for
the degree of dollarization for the 1986-1991 period.  Other  countries in the region have expe-
rienced similar  episodes where the level of foreign currency deposits  (FCD) increased  after a
decrease  in inflation and  expected  depreciation.  These episodes represent  a puzzle for those
that  have tried to explain FCDs using the theory of optimal portfolio composition.  TwNo  pos-
sible hypotheses  have been provided.  The first one is given by Guidotti  and Rodriguez (1991).
They conclude that  dollarization in Latin America has been characterized  by hysteresis.  That
is, once domestic residents substitute  part of their monetary  holdings with dollars, it is costly
for them  to return  to the local currency, even after domestic inflation decreases.  The authors
claim that  agents will only  switch  back to  the  domestic  currency  if the  expected  value of
domestic  money balances  exceeds the  cost of doing so, something  that  has rarely  happened
in Latin  America.  Consequently, they argue that  the degree of dollarization  in Latin America
depends  not  only  on changes in  the  rate  of inflation but  also on its  level.  The  second hy-
pothesis  is proposed by Clements  et al (1992). They argue that  episodes of high inflation will
remain in the memory of domestic  residents for long periods  and are assigned more weight in
comparison to episodes of low inflation.  Therefore,  they maintain  that  several lags have to be
used when regressing inflation against  dollarization.
Finally, institutional  arrangements  also need to be considered when studying  currency sub-
stitution  in Latin America.  Many countries in the region have imposed restrictions  on FCDs
at different periods.  Mexico allowed the public to maintain  FCDs in 1977, prohibited  them in
1982, and partially  allowed them back in 1985. Bolivia allowed them in 1973, prohibited  them
in 1982, and reinstituted  them in  1986. Finally, Peru permitted  them in  1986, forbid them in
1985, and reopened them  in 1988. Governments have prohibited  these deposits  because they
impose important  limitations  on governmental  actions.  First,  the existence of FCD's  compli-
cates  monetary  policy since monetary  targeting  becomes more difficult.  Second, it creates  a
5loss of seigniorage for the government.  Third,  it jeopardizes the central bank's  role as a lender
of last resort.  Finally, it has a large impact  on the banking system.
3  An  Alternative  Approach  to  Currency  Substitution
When estimating  a single money demand equation,  it is usually assumed that  the money mar-
ket is in equilibrium,  and that  the money stock is exogenous.  It is well documented,  however,
that  this  is not  always the  case, since the  money multiplier  is built  into the  money supply,
and  some of its components  are determined  by the  public.  As broader definitions  of money
are considered, more sophisticated  multipliers  are needed.  In order  to  avoid this  identifica-
tion problem, two alternatives  can be considered.  One can estimate  a simultaneous  equation
model, with  one equation  specifying the money demand  and  a feedback rule describing the
money supply.  On the other hand,  one can consider a single money demand  equation  where
the dependent  variable is the ratio  of the two different monies. The effect of the multiplier  is
then  canceled.  In this  paper,  we follow the latter  approach  since it is rather  difficult, if not
impossible, to find a common monetary  feedback rule for all the countries considered in this
study.
Additionally,  in  order  to  take  into  account  the  increasing  openness  of Latin  American
economies during  the  1990s, we consider two additional  assets:  foreign and  domestic bonds.
As financial markets  further  develop the  number of available assets increases,  thus  affecting
the agent's  portfolio decision.
Consider the following standard  money demand equations
log(m d) =  io + i0log(yit)  +  #32Iit  + I3If  (1)
log(mft)  = 'Yo  + 'yilog(yit) +  'Y2't + -Y3I/f  (2)
where m  d  and mnft  denote the real demand for deposits  by domestic residents  in country  i at
time  t  in local  and  foreign currency,  respectively;  Yit is the national  income in country  i  at
time t; Ijdt  is the domestic interest  rate  in country  i at time  t; and  If  represents  the  interest
rate paid on deposits  in U.S dollars in country i at time t.  Subtracting  equation  (1) from (2),
we obtain  the following expression
log (mdt)  =  6d + allo9(yit) + 622I't  + 63Iit  (3)
6If we further  assume that  the uncovered interest parity  condition holds in every country 3 -
i.e, Id=If  +k  Vi, t, where E is defined as the expected appreciation  of the domestic currency
against  the U.S dollar-,  we can write equation  (3) as follows
log (mdi)  do  +  1109g(Yit)  + (62 + 63)Iit  - 63Eit-  (4)
Notice that  if we now define the ratio  Rt  =  mft/(mft + mdt) and broad  money in real terms
as M 3 /P=mf  + md,  it is easy to show that
lo(  m(  =  log (I  (5)
where R is the ratio  of foreign money to broad  money.
Combining equations  (4) and  (5) and allowing country-specific frictions in the uncovered
interest  parity  condition,  i.e.  it  =  + Eit + Eit, we derive  an  estimable  money demand
equation
log (  R,)  =  a + Ollog(yit) + 02Iidt  + 03Eit + Eit.  (6)
Equation  (6) suggests that  the substitution  of domestic currency  by foreign currency can be
partially  explained  by the  expected  appreciation  of the  domestic  currency  against  the  U.S
dollar.  Notice that  if the two demands for money, domestic and foreign, are identical then the
coefficients should be statistically  equal to zero. Therefore, any departure  of the estimates from
zero captures the frictions that  agents face when making the portfolio decision, demonstrating
that  the different monies are not identical.4
Alternatively,  our specification can be interpreted  as a binary choice model where agents
have only two options when depositing their savings: domestic currency or dollar denominated
accounts.  Notice that  if we define the right hand  side of equation  (6) as XO, and we define
Prob(D  = 1)-R  =  1
it is possible  to  recover our  specification.  R  then  can be  interpreted  as  the probabi:lity of
depositing funds in a U.S dollar denominated  account  (D=1),  while 1 - R can be interpreted
as the  probability  of depositing  funds in a  domestic-currency-denominated  account  (:D=O).
3This assumption is suggested by Bordo and Choudri (1982).
'If  we have flexible exchange rates and there are no frictions in the economy,  agents are indifferent with
respect to their money holdings.
7Accordingly, the coefficients of the explanatory  variables of equation  (6) can be interpreted  as
the marginal effects on the probability  of depositing  money in a dollar-denominated  account.
3.1  Data  and  Estimation  Results
The  data  for  this  study  are drawn  from  several sources:  the  1999 International  Financial
Statistics  (IFS) published annually by the International  Monetary Fund (IMF), Levine, Loayza
and Beck (1998), Caprio and  Klingebiel's  (1999) data  set,  and several central banks.
The countries included in the study  are Argentina,  Belize, Bolivia, Costa  Rica, Dominica,
Ecuador,  El Salvador, Honduras,  Mexico, Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Peru  and  Uruguay.  Due to
data  limitations  we concentrate  on  the  1990-1998 period.5 The  resulting  sample  has  117
observations (13 countries,  9 years).
The variables used in the estimation  of equation  (6) were calculated  as follows. The ratio
of FCDs to  domestic currency deposits  measured  at the end of the period was obtained  from
the  IFS,  from  some  central  banks,  and  from  the  IMF  Western  Hemisphere  Department.6
The nominal GDP  per  capita was computed  by dividing the nominal value of GDP  by total
population  and  then multiplying  it by the  end-of-period  exchange rate.7 The  interest  rates
were proxied by the deposit  rates  reported  by the IFS.  Finally, the proxy used for expected
appreciation  was calculated  by subtracting  the U.S. gross rate of inflation from the domestic
gross rate  of inflation.  The summary  statistics  for the sample are presented  in Tables 1 and
2.
Although  each country shows important  peculiarities, some stylized  facts can be derived.
The first important  thing to notice is that  the dollarization ratio has been, in general, steadily
increasing over time.  While  in  1990 the  average ratio  for these countries  was 0.23, in  1998
rose to  0.37.  A second  interesting  fact  is that  this  increase  comes in  a  period  when  the
inflation rate  has demonstrated  a dramatic  decrease.  In 1990 the  average inflation rate  for
the  thirteen  countries  was  1,353% (315% without  counting  the  hyperinflation  episodes  of
Argentina,  Nicaragua  and  Peru);  in  1998 this  figure was 10%.  This  fact  supports  the idea
that  the dollarization  process in Latin  America follows a hysteresis process, since the optimal
portfolio theory  would predict  a return  to the  domestic currencies  once their  expected  value
increases with lower inflation differentials.  In fact, Figure 1 shows that  the inflation differential
5Although information on most monetary and  macroeconomic variables is available since 1970 for all
countries, we could only obtain data on FCDs for all these countries for the nine years.
6FCD include all dollar denominated bank accounts including domestic and foreign banks.
7These variables were obtained from the IFS.
8and the dollarization  ratio tend to  move in opposite directions  when inflation is decreasing.
The results  of our partial dollarization  exercise are presented in Table 3. As expected,  the
coefficient of expected appreciation  is negative and  significant, corroborating  the hypothesis
of currency  substitution  being  dependent  on expected  relative  returns  between  currencies.
Notice  that  the  foreign interest  rates  for the  period  in  consideration  have been relatively
stable  which  accentuates  the  correlation  between  E  and  Id.  The  coefficient of income  is
positive  and  significant:  high-income economies  tend  to  have  a  higher  degree of currency
substitution.  A possible explanation  is given by Chang (1994) where postulates  that  access to
dollar-denominated  accounts is reserved to wealthy agents. In Latin America, there are usually
some fees associated  with  these type  of accounts.  Consequently, one would tend  to  believe
that  only high-income people can  afford to  deposit in foreign currency.  Finally, although  a
negative coefficient was expected for the domestic interest  rate,  this turned  out to be positive,
though  not  significantly different from zero.
In order to check the robustness  of our specification when studying  currency substitution,
suggested by equation  (6), we run several auxiliary regressions.  We first estimated  the fixed-
effects  and  the  random-effects  models  and  compared  their  estimates.  Usually  with  small
samples such as ours, the magnitude,  sign and significance of the estimates  vary widely from
one specification to the next.  However, our model has similar estimates and significance levels,
suggesting a robust specification (see Table 3).8 Theoretically speaking, we are only interested
in the fixed-effects panel since we are not  randomly  drawing countries  from our sample.  In
order to statistically  test that  the fixed effects specification is the preferred one, we performed
the  Haussman  specification  test.  Table  3 reports  the  Haussman  statistic  used  to  test  the
validity of the fixed-effects versus the random-effects model.  The null hypotheses  is accepted
at 95% of significance.
We also considered  the  possibility  of endogeneity  for some  of the  regressors.  Since the
model comes from a partial  equilibrium model we assume income to  be exogenous.  The pos-
sible endogenous variables in the  model are the real interest  rate  and  expected appreciation.
Using one-period lagged values as instruments  for each of these two variables, the Haussman
endogeneity test  was performed.  The  critical  statistical  values for the  interest  rate  and  ex-
pected  appreciation  are 2.02 and  0, respectively. 9 Consequently, we reject the endogeneity of
8In order to check that  our results do not depend on superfluous (non-significant) explanatory variables,
we excluded  them from the regression  and found that  the sign and significance  level corresponding  to the rest
of the variables  describing  the dollarization  phenomena did not substantially change (see Table 4).
9The  actual  statistic  was -0.20,  as is in the  case whenever the  variance-covariance  elements  are very close
9these regressors at 95% of significance.  Unfortunately,  since our data  set  is fairly small, the
Haussman test  has not much power.
Finally,  if  the  theory  is to  have  any  validity,  any  deviation  in  the  demand  for money
must  be necessarily temporary.  Hence a key assumption  of the theory  is that  the errors  are
stationary.  We checked for cointegration  by studying  the  residuals  from  equation  (6) and
found that  they  are indeed  stationary.  However, the significance of this  test  should not  be
considered conclusive since we only have nine residuals.
After considering all of the auxiliary regressions, we conclude that  our specification is fairly
robust, explaining the relative movements between dollar and domestic-denominated  accounts.
Such movements  are  explained by  appreciation  expectations  of the  domestic  currency  and
income, demonstrating  that  depositors  in Latin  America face some uncertainty  and  frictions
when making their portfolio decisions.
4  Currency  Substitution  and  Banking  Crises
In the  1980s and  early 1990s a number  of countries experienced severe banking crises.  Such
proliferation  of large-scale banking sector problems has raised widespread  concern, as bank-
ing crises disrupt  the flow of credit  to households  and  enterprises,  reducing  investment  and
consumption  and possibly forcing viable firms into bankruptcy.  Banking crises may also jeop-
ardize  the functioning  of the  payments  system  and,  by undermining  confidence in domestic
financial institutions,  they may cause a decline in domestic savings and/or  a large-scale capital
outflow.  Finally, a systemic crisis may force banks  to  shut down.  Therefore,  preventing  the
occurrence of systemic banking problems is undoubtedly  a major  concern of policymakers.
While a number of studies have recently analyzed various episodes of banking sector dis-
tress, most of them are case studies,  and just  a few present econometric analyses.  The purpose
of this  section is to formally investigate  the effect of currency substitution  on banking crises.
A  variety  of  theoretical  models  try  to  explain  the  link  between  currency  and  banking
crises.  One chain of causation  runs from balance of payment  problems to  banking crises. For
example, Mishkin  (1996) argues that  if a devaluation  occurs, the  position  of banks  could be
weakened further  if a large share of their  liabilities is denominated  in foreign currency. On the
other hand,  models such as Velasco (1987) point to the opposite causal direction; i.e, financial
sector problems give rise to the currency  collapse.
to zero.
10There  seems to be consensus that  the  effect that  currency substitution  may have on the
banking system is ambiguous.  On the one hand,  a high level of dollar deposits  in an economy
in which the  dollar is used  as a store  of value but  not  as a medium  of exchange will result
in higher exchange rate  risk in banks'  balance sheets,  since these banks  will take deposits  in
dollars but  will typically lend in domestic currency.'"  On the other hand,  a system that  allows
the coexistence  of domestic currency  deposits  and  FCDs can help prevent  a capital  outflow
by increasing the buffer that  banks have, increasing their ability to absorb bad shocks. In this
section we will try to determine  which effect dominates.
As preliminary evidence, we investigate how the probability  of a banking crisis is influenced
by the degree of dollarization  in the economy. Using the Caprio et al (1999) database  which
reports  the  banking crises for a large set  of countries,  we can then  calculate  the probability
of a  banking  crisis for all  the  countries  in  our study  given a  certain  level of dollarization.
In  order  these  conditional  probabilities,  we then  divide  our sample  between  high  andi low
dollarized  economies." 1 We then  find that  the probability  of a banking  crisis,  of any  kind,
increases with  the  degree of dollarization.  In  particular,  the  probability  of a banking  crisis
given that  the  economy is highly dollarized  is 0.381.  On the  other  hand,  if the  economy is
not  highly dollarized  the  probability  of a  banking  crisis is 0.130.  We then  investigate  how
the degree of dollarization  affects the nature  of a banking crisis.  Using Caprio's  classification
and considering all the countries  in our study, we compute  the probability  of having a severe
banking  crisis given a  certain  degree of dollarization."2 We find  that  the  probability  of a
severe banking crisis increases with the degree of dollarization,  presumably  because of higher
exposure.  In  particular,  the  probability  of a severe banking  crisis given that  the  economy
is highly  dollarized  is 0.302.  On  the  other  hand,  if the  economy  is not  highly  dollarized
the  probability  of a  severe banking  crisis is 0.130.  Note,  the  probability  of having  rmajor
banking  problems  in  a  highly  dollarized  economy  is roughly  three  times  larger  than  in  a
mildly dollarized economy.
In  order  to  present  stronger  evidence,  it  is necessary  to  introduce  additional  controls.
Following Demirgiuc-Kunt and Detragiache  (1998), we consider a multivariate  logit specifica-
tion.  This  approach can identify  a number of interesting  correlations.  However, since we are
"This  may weaken  the Central bank's ability to be an efficient  lender of last resort.
1  When the average is above 30%  for the period 1990  to 1998,  the economy  is classified  as highly dollarized.
This classification  is suggested by Balinio,  Bennett and Borenstein (1997).
12Caprio et.  al.  (1999) classify  the banking crises into two major groups: systemic banking crises where
most or all of banking system capital is eroded, and mild banking crises.
11estimating  a reduced form equation  without  support  from a specific structural  model,  such
correlations  should be interpreted  with  caution  because they do not  specify the direction of
causality.
The presence of individual effects in panel data  complicates the estimation  of any limited
dependent  variable model, since the fixed-effects can not be consistently  estimated  for a fixed
number of observations.  In order to  avoid this problem we may consider a limited dependent
variable model for each country.  Unfortunately,  due  to data  limitations,  this  alternative  can
only be studied for a subset  of countries.13
Within  a macroeconomic framework, previous  work on banking  crises has not  systemat--
ically addressed  the  issue of persistence.  Some authors  ignore  the  issue  altogether,  others
consider observations up  to  the first  crisis, and  finally some studies  introduce  the length  of
the crisis as an indicator  of persistence.  We propose a more formal framework that  will allow
us to study the effect of a previous crisis by considering a two-stage Markov process. In other
words, we allow for the possibility that  the previous outcome  may affect future crisis. 14 As a
result,  we consider the following conditional probability,
P(YtlYt-1)  = F(Xto  + XtYt-la)
where  P(YtlYt-1) is the  probability  that  a banking  crisis takes  place  given what  happened
in  the  previous  period,  F  is the  logistic distribution  function,  Xt  is the  set  of explanatory
variables,  and ,  and  a  are the parameters  to be estimated.  This  conditional  probability  can
be thought  of in terms of the following Markov transition  probabilities
Po,  =  F(Xto)
Pi,  =  F(XtI  + XtYt-la).
If shocks to the banking system persist, we expect that  the predicted probabilities for Pi,  to
be greater  than  Po, whenever we have two consecutive crises.  Unfortunately,  the information
set  on  which we condition  the  probabilities  is restricted,  since there  exists  high correlation
among the XtEYt- variables.'5 Therefore,  the  Markov transition  probabilities  are restricted
to  the  interaction  between  the  degree of currency  substitution  and  the  past  banking  crisis.
Furthermore,  due  to  data  limitations  we consider one control  at  a time.  The variables  we
'3For the  majority  of the  countries  in our panel,  long time series on dollar  accounts  are not  available.
"See  Amemiya  (1997) for a complete  discussion  on Markov processes.
'5Since we have a small data  set, the  correlations  among the  XtYt-,  are greater  than  the  correlations  among
the  Xt's  because  of reduced variance  among  the  variables.
12control  for  are:  the  growth  rate  of GDP,  the  real  interest  rate  (RIR),  the  growth  rate  of
exports  (EXP),  the  growth rate  of inflation  (INF),  the  growth  rate  of industrial  output
(OUT)  and  the  growth  rate  of private  credit  (PRC).  The  transitional  probabilities  were
estimated  separately  for Bolivia, Mexico and Peru. 6 The estimation  results  are presented in
Tables 5, 6 and 7.
Our estimates  show that  banking  crises are persistent  over time.  The corresponding pre-
dicted probabilities  for Pl1 in all cases are much larger than  Po,, always predicting  the event
of two consecutive crises. Furthermore,  the  coefficient corresponding  to the persistence effect
is always positive and significantly different from zero at the 95% level. The effect of the con-
temporaneous  degree of currency substitution  is always negative, although  it is not significant
in all models.  On the other hand,  the degree of currency substitution  in the previous period is
always positive and statistically  significant. This evidence suggests that  the higher the degree
of currency  substitution  today, the lower the probability  of a banking  crisis today.  High dol-
larization  may increase intermediation,  thus  increasing the response of the banking system in
the event of a bad  shock, stopping  the outflow of capital.  On the other  hand,  once the crisis
has  occurred, having more dollar-denominated  deposits  in the  banking system  increases the
probability  of a longer crisis in the future, which may correspond  to increasing exchange rate
exposure in an already  weak banking system.
In order to check the robustness of the persistence phenomena,  we considered an alternative
specification:
P(Yt  = 1) = F(Xt±  + Yt-1j)
where 77  captures  the significance of persistence  when describing the probability  of a banking
crisis.
As in the previous case, our results  show that  banking crises have a strong component  of
persistence.  In all models, the persistence  effect is positive and  statically  significant at 90%
confidence levels.  Similarly, the contemporaneous  degree of currency  substitution  is  always
negative  and  is significant in some models.  The estimation  results  for Bolivia,  Mexico and
Peru  are presented  in Tables 8, 9 and  10, respectively.
"In  order to capture periods in which FCD were prohibited we introduce a dummy called FORCED.
135  Currency  Substitution  and  Volatility
According to many authors,  from Keynes to  Friedman,  interactions  between  the conduct  of
monetary  policy and the financial system create  considerable scope for endogenous  volatility
and indeterminacy.  In particular,  in order for agents to transact  with  fiat money they must
have beliefs about  its  future exchangeable opportunities,  thus  allowing room  for endogenous
volatility.  Azariadis  (1981) in his classic paper  of self-fulfilling prophecies showed that  the
possibility of sun spot equilibria allows for endogenous fluctuations.  Following this argumen-
t,  introducing  another  asset  -dollar-denominated  deposits-  into  the financial system  may
induce higher volatility  in the macroeconomy.
There are several theoretical models in which the interaction  of fiat money and the financial
system yields endogenous volatility.  This class of models is usually characterized  by the rate
of return  dominance  on fiat money, as well as frictions  in the  economic environment  where
complete  insurance  is not  possible.  For example,  Bencivenga,  Huybens  and  Smith  (1998)
study  which policy is  "best"  for maintaining  a  constant  price level in  an  open  economy. 17
Indeterminacies and endogenous volatility that  arise in a nonstochastic  model have important
consequences because  they  give us information  on  how exogenous shocks  are  transmitted
through  the economy. Furthermore,  if agents are risk averse any policy that  reduces volatility,
other things  equal, will result in a welfare improving situation.
In  terms  of  policy  advice,  the  effect of  volatility  on  macroeconomic  aggregates  is  of
paramount  importance  for a large number of Latin  American  countries.  Many of these coun-
tries have adopted  stabilization  programs designed by the IMF and World Bank that  require
the targeting  of certain macroeconomic variables.  Theoretically  speaking, there is not  a clear
understanding  of the general equilibrium  effects of certain  targeting  policies.  As a result,  it
would be better  to  target  aggregates that  are less volatile.
The previous literature  on currency substitution  has not provided much empirical evidence
linking the degree of dollarization  and volatility.  The studies  that  have addressed  the  issue
focus on money demand  and money multipliers.  Balifio et al (1997) argue that  money demand
appears to be more volatile in highly dollarized economies, since the coefficient of variation on
the velocity of money is markedly higher than that  of moderately  dollarized economies. They
find mixed evidence with  respect to the volatility  of the money multiplier.
In this paper we attempt  to provide additional  evidence linking volatility and dollarization.
17A "good" policy is defined whenever it reduces indeterminacies and endogenous  volatility since they all
attain the same welfare  levels.
14In particular,  we explore the effects of dollarization on volatility across countries.  The measure
of volatility  we use for each variables is defined as its standard  deviation divided by its mean,
so cross-country comparisons can be made.  The level of dollarization was proxied by the mean
of the ratio of FCDs to broad  money." 8 As preliminary evidence we computed  the correlations
between the degree of dollarization  (R) and  broad money  (BM),  the exchange rate  (EXC),
per capita  GDP, real interest  rates  (RIR)  and the inflation rate  (INF).  Our results  confirm
that  volatility increases as the degree of dollarization in the economy rises.  Furthermore,  the
correlations range  from 0.43 for broad  money to  0.31 for per  capita  GDP.  The  correlations
corresponding to several macroeconomic variables  are reported  in Table 11.
Unfortunately,  our sample is very small; we  just  have 13 observations (one for each country)
therefore  we do not  have a  robust  statistic  to  test  our  null hypothesis.  In order  to  avoid
the small  sample problem,  we performed  several bootstraps.  We randomly  choose 13 pairs
from our original data  set  and compute  the corresponding correlation  repeating  the process a
thousand  times.'9 As a result,  we get an empirical  distribution  of the resulting  correlations.
We then  use the  empirical  distribution  to  statistically  test  the  null  hypothesis  that  higher
dollarization  is associated  with  higher volatility.
Our results  reveal  that  the  variables  most  closely linked to  the  banking  sector  (interest
rates and inflation) have a statistically  positive correlation with the level of dollarization at the
90% level. 20 The characteristics  of the empirical distributions  corresponding to the bootstrap
correlations are presented  in Table  12. This may suggest that  some volatility  arises whenever
the  economy becomes more dollarized,  although  our test  does  not  indicate  the  direction  of
causality.  Therefore, having a highly dollarized economy may make the targeting of monetary
aggregates  a rather  difficult task.
6  Conclusions
In this paper we study how agents in Latin America allocate their balances between dollar-and
domestic-denominated  accounts.  In particular,  we show that  the relative movements between
these accounts are explained by devaluation expectations  of the local currency and GDP. As a
"Therefore, our data set consists of thirteen observations, one for each country.
" 9The pairs consisted of the degree of dollarization and the measure of volatility for each macroeconomic
variable under study.
20Since the inflation rate was computed using the CPI and most of the goods in the basket are purchased
using local currency the volatility of the price level may be accentuated.
15result, we are able to demonstrate  that  depositors  in Latin  America do face some uncertainty
and frictions when making their portfolio decisions.
We also explore some  of the  macroeconomic  consequences of a dollarized  economy.  In
particular,  we find that  past  banking crises are good predictors  of future  crises. Our findings
suggest that  an increase of dollarization  today is associated  with a contemporaneous  decrease
in  the  probability  of a banking  crisis.  In  other  words, having  a  highly dollarized economy
increases intermediation,  thus increasing  the response of the banking system in the case of a
bad shock which halts the outflow of capitals.  On the other hand, once the crisis has occurred,
having more dollar-denominated  deposits  in the banking system  increases the probability  of
a longer crisis in the future,  because  it increases exchange rate  exposure  in an already  weak
banking system.
Finally,  we show that  the  volatility  of macroeconomic  variables  linked  to  the  financial
system  increases whenever the  economy becomes more dollarized,  which in turn  makes the
choice of monetary  targets  more difficult.
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Figure  1: Aggregate degree of dollaxization and inflation rate  differential for the region.
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Figure 5:  Bolivia's FCD to broad  money for 1969-1998.
21Table  1: Summary  Statistics  by  Year
Year  R (%)  GDP  E  Id
1990  23.46  1030.00  1348.20  1555.01
(24.61)  (731.42)  (2792.29)  (4738.67)
1991  25.99  1214.90  290.40  326.40
(25.87)  (1046.07)  (804.09)  (757.45)
1992  27.37  1423.68  22.91  37.78
(25.74)  (1318.28)  (23.81)  (45.11)
1993  29.30  1547.85  16.83  23.04
(26.36)  (1390.03)  (17.81)  (18.29)
1994  30.05  1508.33  12.06  19.51
(24.79)  (1332.98)  (12.55)  (12.16)
1995  32.24  1539.13  13.81  17.16
(25.37)  (1335.08)  (12.90)  (9.77)
1996  35.27  1702.81  11.82  20.16
(27.06)  (1503.50)  (10.33)  (12.41)
1997  35.73  1916.64  8.62  17.41
(27.06)  (1688.65)  (9.28)  (9.77)
1998  37.66  1831.59  8.51  14.13
(27.20)  (1654.12)  (9.59)  (6.23)
Standard deviations are presented in parentheses.
22Table 2: Summary  Statistics  by  Country:  1990-1998
Country  R (%)  GDP  E  Id
1.  Argentina  41.74  4877.09  277.99  183.28
(5.76)  (1056.55)  (763.43)  (500.77)
2.  Belize  1.486  1785.73  -0.73  8.64
(0.88)  (152.50)  (1.83)  (0.47)
3.  Bolivia  67.97  606.22  8.24  19.66
(8.03)  (92.61)  (4.33)  (3.98)
4.  Costa Rica  30.38  1661.45  14.51  18.42
(4.53)  (266.75)  (5.66)  (4.85)
5.  Dominica  1.81  213.81  -0.62  4.07
(0.96)  (30.17)  (1.65)  (0.13)
6.  Ecuador  13.12  868.18  34.47  38.86
(10.23)  (165.16)  (11.32)  (6.22)
7.  El Salvador  5.03  1017.64  8.63  13.87
(1.78)  (296.61)  (5.65)  (2.42)
8.  Honduras  13.21  490.85  17.539  13.80
(9.49)  (155.86)  (7.98)  (4.08)
9.  Mexico  13.77  2495.70  17.73  19.83
(3.43)  (494.86)  (9.66)  (8.59)
10.  Nicaragua  47.18  307.00  1166.48  11.45
(14.94)  (43.33)  (2558.20)  (0.90)
11.  Paraguay  32.33  1092.07  14.47  19.78
(7.49)  (150.84)  (8.46)  (3.59)
12.  Peru  54.57  1353.25  894.19  310.77
(6.83)  (465.58)  (2471)  (799.86)
13.  Uruguay  77.62  3041.46  50.57  44.99
(2.81)  (1039.13)  (34.04)  (26.83)
Standard  deviations  are  presented  in parentheses.
23Table 3: Estimation  Results  for  Latin  American  Countries:  1990-1998
Specification  Variable  Estimates  t-stat  P-value
log(y)  0.614  2.237  [0.027]
(0.274)
Fixed Effects  I"  0.514E-03  1.515  [0.133]
(FE)  (0.33E-03)
E  -0.18E-03  -2.359  [0.020]
(0.77E-04)
c  -5.561  -3.154  [0.002]
(1.763)
log(y)  0.603  2.481  [0.013]
(0.243)
Random  Effects  Id  0.50E-03  1.530  [0.126]
(RE)  (0.328-03)
E  -0.17E-03  -2.295  [0.022]
(0.76E-04)
Adjusted R2=0.901 (FE); and Adjusted R2=0.887 (RE).
Haussman  test  for Ho: FE  vs RE:  x2(3)=3.1891.
Standard  errors  are  presented  in parentheses.
Table 4: Auxiliary  Regressions
Specification  Variable  Estimates  t-stat  P-value
log(y)  0.410  1.701  [0.091]
(0.274)
Fixed Effects  E  -0.187-03  -1.797  [0.075]
(0.593-04)
Adjusted  R2=0.899  (FE).
Standard  errors are  presented  in parentheses.
24Table  5: Estimation  Results  of F(Xt,i  + XtYt-la)  for  Bolivia:  1970-1998
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Rt  -0.046  -1.406**  -0.055  -0.055  1.612  -0.06
(0.122)  (0.558)  (0.138)  (0.149)  (1.722)  (0.175)
RtYt-,  3.692**  2.679**  3.276**  3.763**  3.302**  3.156**
(1.299)  (1.1)  (1.204)  (1.336)  (1.242)  (1.177)
FORCED  1.288  0.329  0.892  1.215  8.269*  0.496













Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  (**) represents 10% (5%) significance  level.
25Table  6: Estimation  Results  of  F(Xt,3 + XtYtcla)  for  Mexico:  1981-1998
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Rt  -0.697  -1.403*  -3.947*  -4.104*  -1.574  -2.883
(1.064)  (0.837)  (2.378)  (2.315)  (1.141)  (1.715.)
RtYtY1 2.378**  2.393**  2.743*  2.700*  2.422**  2.428*
(1.150)  (1.186)  (1.494)  (1.426)  (1.218)  (1.243)
FORCED  -0.452  -2.058  -3.771  -2.268  -1.586  -1.315













Standard errors are in parentheses.
* (**) represents 10% (5%) significance  level.
26Table 7: Estimation  Results  of  F(Xt,B + XtYt-,  ac) for  Peru:  1966-1998
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Rt  -3.430*  -3.067**  -3.310  -3.091**  -3.414
(2.027)  (1.036)  (2.036)  (1.038)  (2.451)
R,tYt-  4.432**  3.988**  4.395**  3.816**  4.461**











Standard errors are in parentheses.
*  (*$) represents 10% (5%) significance  level.
27Table 8: Estimation  Results  of  F(Xt,/  + Yt-177)  for  Bolivia:  1970-1998
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Rt  -0.045  -1.462**  -0.055  -0.053  1.924  -0.058
(0.119)  (0.571)  (0.137)  (0.141)  (1.882)  (0.167)
FORCED  1.482  0.33  1.013  1.43  9.289*  0.578
(1.45)  (1.735)  (1.401)  (1.487)  (4.956)  (1.321)
Yt_1  4.411**  3.196**  3.899**  4.514**  3.971**  3.759**













Standard errors are in parentheses.
* (**) represents 10% (5%) significance  level.
28Table 9: Estimation  Results  of  F(Xt,/  + Yt-1P7)  for  Mexico:  1981-1998
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Rt  -0.639  -1.381*  3.294  -2.592  -1.517  -1.549
(1.164)  (0.790)  (2.158)  (1.730)  (1.095)  (1.425)
FORCED  -1.625  -3.259  -4.606  -3.044  -2.883  -2.468
(2.070)  (2.298)  (3.068)  (2.113)  (2.349)  (1.843)
Yt- I  3.094**  3.125**  3.216**  3.040*  3.215**  3.102**













Standard errors are in parentheses.
* (**) represents 10% (5%) significance  level.
29Table 10: Estimation  Results  of  F(Xt,i  + Yt- 1i7) for  Peru:  1966-1998
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Rt  -0.233  -2.511**  -0.313  -3.114**  -0.325
(1.080)  (0.759)  (1.186)  (1.037)  (1.084)
Yt_  5.223**  5.478**  5.187**  3.900**  4.766**











Standard  errors are in parentheses.
*  (**)  represents 10% (5%) significance  level.







30Table  12: Empirical  Distribution  of  the  Bootstraped  Correlations
Variable  Max  Min  Stdev  Kurtosis  Skewness  Mean
GDP  0.93077  -0.83291  0.30858  0.52412  -0.70223  0.29112
RIR  0.96232  -0.64593  0.19342  1.61774  -0.22124  0.40419**
EXC  0.96547  -0.85496  0.30062  0.42518  -0.59701  0.30457
INF  0.96556  -0.75100  0.22892  1.28906  -0.059062  0.35579*
BM  0.94417  -0.70509  0.23255  0.78703  -0.72988  0.42009
*  (**) represents  10% (5%) significance level.
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